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PIGEONHOLES IN THE PUBLIC FORUM
Gary C. Leedes*
I. INTRODUCTION
Streets, parks, and similar places traditionally used for purposes
of discussion and assembly are public forums1 where people have
liberty to communicate their thoughts.2 Persons lacking the status,
money or charisma necessary to command coverage by the mass
media often desperately seek access to the public forum. Once ac-
cess is obtained, ideas can be communicated in a cost-effective
manner. However, like other first amendment cases, public forum
cases are not fungible. The varying weights of competing interests
and the instability of ad hoc balancing tests have created a need
for doctrinal structure. The Supreme Court's evolving public fo-
rum doctrine is an attempt to meet that need.
The Supreme Court "has confronted a wide variety of first
amendment access claims" 3 in public forum cases, and the resul-
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.S.E., 1960,
University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1962, Temple Law School; LL.M., 1973, Harvard Law
School; S.J.D., 1984, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank his research assis-
tant, David Downes, for his research and helpful comments. The author is also grateful to
Howard C. Anawalt, Gene R. Nichol, and Robert Post, who contributed helpful comments
on previous drafts.
1. In Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), the modem Supreme Court's public forum doc-
trine began to emerge. A city ordinance prohibiting all public meetings in public places
without a permit was challenged. In a frequently quoted passage, Justice Roberts' plurality
opinion stated:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of
the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of
the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on na-
tional questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative,
and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and
in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation,
be abridged or denied.
307 U.S. at 515-16.
2. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1,
11-12; see also M. NIMMER, NImmER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 4.09[D] (1984).
3. Note, Leading Cases, the Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 99 HARv. L. REv. 120, 203 (1985).
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tant law is complex. This article identifies the variables that be-
come pertinent when speakers4 claim they have rights of access to
government property. It also discusses the concepts of "fully pro-
tected," "somewhat protected" and "non-protected" expression."
Several of the government's "reasons" for restricting expressive ac-
tivity' and five different types of government bans on expression
are identified.7 Several different types of government discrimina-
tion,' the government's various "methods of suppression" and the
speaker's "methods of communication" are also described." Finally,
this article discusses the speaker's rights in a public forum, in a
limited or designated forum, and in a nonpublic forum.10
The doctrinal structure of first amendment 1 law has become in-
creasingly compartmentalized, 2 and as a result the "pigeonhole"
into which a controversy is placed often determines the outcome.
Yet, the Court still seems to be groping for clearer cut rules and
more manageable principles and standards.
4. The term "speaker" refers to persons who claim they are exercising first amendment
rights of speech, press, association, assembly and petition. Another variable, not discussed in
this article, is the occupation of the speaker. For example, a government employee's privi-
lege to criticize government officials may be subjected to restrictions not imposed on the
general public. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
5. See infra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 49-68 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 69-115 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 116-150 . This article does not discuss the speaker's rights of access to
private property.
11. The first amendment is implicated when it is plausible to argue that a person has a
right to communicate "X." "X" refers to some object of cognition. It could be a word, an
idea, a signal or some other symbol that signifies meaning. When the person has the right to
communicate "X," the government has a duty not to suppress "X." The government has an
obligation not to punish the person for exercising his rights. The author uses the jurispru-
dential notion that duties and obligations are correlatives to rights. The word "right" is used
loosely to embrace first amendment liberties and freedoms. For a more careful and critical
analysis of the concept of a right, see A. WHITE, RIGHTS (1984).
12. Professor Tribe notes, "This fragmentation of the First Amendment into a grab bag
of rubrics under which different types of speech receive different degrees of protection ...
can lead to ridiculous conclusions." L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 218 (1985). He adds,
"This sort of pigeonholing endangers the pigeon. If one parses First Amendment doctrine
too fine, one may soon discover that little protection for expression remains." Id. Tribe's
fears notwithstanding, too much unstructured balancing can also be an unsatisfactory first
amendment approach because it provides virtually no guidance to lower court judges. In any
event, whether pigeonholing is good, bad, or neutral, the purpose of this article is to help
practicing lawyers find the pigeonholes into which their cases fit.
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II. VARIABLES AFFECTING LEVELS OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY13
A. Categories of Expression
The intensity of judicial review depends in part on the kind of
expression burdened by a challenged government action. Some ex-
13. The following outline is a summary of the levels of judicial scrutiny, uncomplicated by
variables, which might intensify or dilute judicial scrutiny:
A. BANS ON PROTECTED AND SOMEWHAT PROTECTED EXPRESSION IN
TRADITIONAL AND LIMITED PUBLIC FORUMS
1. The government's evidence must clearly show that a subordinating, compelling
and particularized legitimate interest is substantially furthered. Schad v. Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env't,
444 U.S. 620 (1980).
2. The government's restriction must be narrowly tailored, uniformly applied and
necessary (i.e., the burden on speech is justified if no less burdensome alternative
to a total ban is practicable). The Court should place the burden of justifying a
total ban on the government.
B. CONTENT DISCRIMINATION CASES IN TRADITIONAL AND LIMITED
PUBLIC FORUMS
1. The government's evidence must clearly show that a subordinating, compelling
and particularized legitimate interest is substantially furthered. See Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
2. The discrimination must be narrowly tailored and must also be necessary in that
no less discriminatory classification is practicable for the furtherance of the
government's compelling interests (i.e., no overinclusive or underinclusive
classifications). The Court should place the burden of justifying a total ban on
the government.
3. Content discrimination refers to discrimination against protected speech on the
basis of speaker identity, subject matter or viewpoint.
C. TIME, PLACE AND MANNER RESTRICTION IN TRADITIONAL AND
LIMITED PUBLIC FORUMS
1. Evidence must show that a significant legitimate governmental interest is
furthered. However, the evidentiary showing need not be as clear and convincing
as in flat ban or content discrimination cases. See Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
2. There is a diluted, narrowly drawn statutory requirement as well as a diluted
less-burdensome-alternative test. Heffron, 420 U.S. 640. Note that the less-
burdensome-alternative test does not apply in all cases. See Regan v. Time, Inc.,
468 U.S. 641 (1984).
3. The Court considers whether there are ample and adequate alternative forums or
channels of communication.
4. The restriction must be content neutral; if not, the tests for content
discrimination apply (Section B infra).
D. RESTRICTIONS IN NONPUBLIC FORUMS (GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
NOT OPEN GENERALLY TO PUBLIC FOR EXPRESSION OF IDEAS)
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pression is fully protected, and restrictions on fully protected cate-
gories of speech frequently trigger the strictest scrutiny.14 Some
specific sub-categories of fully protected expressions, like news-
worthy reports,15 are placed "on the highest rung of the hierarchy,
of First Amendment values." '16
Commercial speech, 17 and in some contexts various formulations
of sexually explicit speech, are placed in a "somewhat protected"
speech category. As a result, the government may limit the number
of theaters that show sexually explicit "adult" films. "[I]t is mani-
fest that society's interest in protecting this [category] of expres-
sion is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the inter-
est in untrammeled political debate . . . . ,, Thus, for some
categories of expression, a diminished level of judicial scrutiny is
appropriate. 19
1. The Court simply asks if the restriction is reasonable and the viewpoint neutral.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); United
States v. Greenburg Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
2. If the restriction is reasonable in light of the forum's primary or dedicated
purpose, the restriction will be upheld with great deference.
3. The government's failure to show less burdensome alternatives or ample
alternative forums is not fatal to its case.
14. But see United States v. Albertini, 105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985) (exclusion from military
base upheld because it was based on reasonable grounds).
15. Different kinds of speech are now ranked in importance. For one commentator's rank-
ings, see Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 107
(1982). Highly ranked are political, religious, philosophical, social and scientific speech. Id.
at 140-41.
16. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 381 (1984).
17. Commercial speech, within the scope of the first amendment, is entitled to less exten-
sive protection than that afforded noncommercial speech. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983). Commercial speech which proposes an illicit transaction is
non-protected speech. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estate, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 496 (1982). Misleading and deceptive commercial speech is also non-protected. See gen-
erally A. Cox, FoREwORD: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE BURGER COURT 32-39 (1981).
Therefore, the intermediate level of scrutiny, usually applied when speakers engage in com-
mercial speech, is not employed when the speaker proposes an illegal transaction or engages
in misleading and deceptive commercial speech. See Posades De Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Balancing is also unnecessary in certain cases involving law-
yers who initiate personal contacts with persons they desire as clients. Compare Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985) with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
18. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion of
Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and White and Rehnquist, J.J.).
19. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1986); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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Not all kinds of expression are protected by the first amend-
ment. Restrictions on non-protected expressive categories 0 do not
usually trigger intensified judicial scrutiny; a different level, mini-
mal scrutiny, is employed. For example, since obscenity is placed
in a non-protected speech category, rational bans on obscenity are
upheld.21
B. Reasons for the Government's Restrictions on Expression
Given the right combination of circumstances, the following four
reasons will justify governmental decisions that restrict expression:
(1) Protection of the speaker's audience; for example, the gov-
ernment tries to protect children from the corrupting effects of
obscenity.22
(2) Protection of persons likely to be immediately harmed by
the speaker's responsive audience.2 3 For example, if A's speech in-
cites B to bomb a building, the government restriction protects the
intended victims or bystanders from the anticipated, imminent
and likely violence (whether or not violence actually occurs).
(3) Protection of a captive sensitive audience 24 from messages
that are repulsive and intolerable.
(4) Furtherance of regulatory objectives unrelated to cognition.2
When the government bans loud sound trucks and its sole objec-
tive is the elimination of eardrum shattering noise, the regulatory
objective is unrelated to cognition. The government is not con-
20. In this article, categories of expression outside the coverage of the first amendment
are called "non-protected." Categories of expression within the first amendment that rank
high in value are called "fully protected." Categories of expression afforded less than full
protection are called "somewhat protected." For example, commercial speech and sexually
explicit speech do not rank as high as expression that refers to political matters of public
concern.
21. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
22. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
23. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (states cannot forbid or proscribe advo-
cacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action).
24. See Justice Powell's separate opinion in Rosenfield v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 903-
09 (1972), where he argued that the use of scurrilous language in front of an unwilling and
sensitive audience assembled at a school board meeting was unprotected by the first
amendment.
25. Cognition is the mental process or faculty by which knowledge is acquired; i.e., that
which comes to be known through perception, reasoning, intuition, revelation or through
some other psychological process or faculty.
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cerned with the speaker's general assertions of fact or value or with
the audience's receptivity to the speaker's assertions.26 Therefore,
an intermediate level of scrutiny is frequently used to determine
the reasonableness of such genuine time, place, and manner
restrictions.
The Supreme Court's strictest scrutiny is usually activated when
the government is concerned with censorship, i.e., preventing, sup-
pressing or changing the cognitive impact of fully protected com-
munications. 2 Note, however, that other legally significant vari-
ables may become pertinent 29 and therefore alter the outcome. For
example, the average citizen may criticize a government official
with impunity, but a government employee who criticizes his supe-
rior may, in some situations, be suspended without a hearing.30 Be-
cause of the many variables involved, not all government restric-
tions fit neatly into content-based or content-neutral pigeonholes.31
The following section further illustrates the fragmentation of pub-
lic forum doctrine.
C. Types of Government Bans
There are several types of government bans of freedom of ex-
pression, including broad bans on wide ranges of expression, total
bans on particular modes of expression, partial bans that are
keyed to content or to time, place and manner considerations, and
complex bans keyed to modes of expression and content, as well as
time, place and manner considerations. 2
26. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 280 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
27. The government's method of restraint may affect the level of scrutiny. For example, a
-prior restraint that is standardless or vague is given close scrutiny. Similarly, the speakers'
methods of communicating their message may be intolerable, and therefore heightened judi-
cial intermediate scrutiny is inappropriate.
The Supreme Court's test for time, place and manner restrictions is less strict in cases
that do not involve a speaker's access to a forum. In such cases the Court does not usually
inquire about less burdensome alternatives and ample alternative channels of communica-
tion. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984).
28. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 n.7 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely,
408 U.S. 92, 95, 98-99 (1972).
29. First amendment principles cannot be easily applied unmodified to "unique forms of
expression" like billboard advertising. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500-02
(1981).
30. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983).
31. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1986).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 43-46 (discussion of FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978)); see also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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A broad ban flatly prohibiting "a wide range of expression" is
exemplified by a county ordinance that totally and permanently
excludes all expression from government facilities, including
parks.3 3 This type of ban does not discriminate, but denies every-
one fundamental access rights to the public forum. Although pre-
cedent is not solid, it is safe to assume that such bans are unconsti-
tutional because of substantial overbreadth.34 Total bans on
particular types of expression also suppress protected speech. In-
deed, the cases strongly suggest that there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a total ban on a particular type of speech, for exam-
ple, charitable solicitation, is unconstitutional.3 5
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a ban restricting
a type of expression and a partial ban restricting the manner of
expression. A ban on loud sound trucks would restrict the manner
of expression, but a city's permanent ban on all sound amplifica-
tion is an overbroad total ban on a type of expression. 6
Professor Gunther suggests that total bans on billboards, posted
signs on public property, handbills, as well as bans on sleeping in
the park, are examples of total bans "on a particular format. 3 7
Gunther complains that "modern prohibitions on particular for-
mats have . . . been subjected to less intense scrutiny than con-
tent-based distinctions." 38 Gunther, however, includes symbolic
speech formats with "pure speech" formats,39 and bans on sym-
bolic speech normally trigger less than strict scrutiny.40
A content-neutral partial ban is often permissible. For example,
the government may restrict some handbilling on busy subway
platforms during rush hour for safety reasons.4 1 This type of par-
tial ban does not usually violate the first amendment as long as the
speaker has other reasonable alternative channels of communica-
tion. On the other hand, a content-based partial ban is disfavored
33. See Henrico County, Va., Board of Supervisors' Resolution (January 26, 1983) (on file
with University of Richmond Law Review).
34. Cf. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (ban on live entertainment); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
35. See, e.g., Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
36. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
37. G. GUNTHER, CONsTrruToNAL LAW 1168-69 (1985).
38. Id. at 1169.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 81-115 (discussion of pure speech).
40. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see infra text accompanying notes 86-
88 (further discussion of symbolic speech).
41. See Wright v. Chief of Transit Police, 558 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1977).
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because government officials are not competent or trustworthy
enough to determine whether the content of the protected expres-
sion is worthy of an audience.42
Complex bans are simultaneously based on considerations of
content, time, place and manner considerations, and they are also
keyed to a particular mode of expression.43 In one difficult case,
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,44
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) disapproved of a
radio broadcast because the language used was vulgar, indecent,
offensive and inappropriate during the mid-afternoon when chil-
dren were listening.45 Broadcasting over radio airwaves was the
particular mode of expression involved in Pacifica, the use of of-
fensive words was the manner of expression, and the FCC's con-
cern with the undesirable impact of the indecent words was not
content-neutral. In sum, the government's action was a complex
ban partially based on the content of a mode of expression com-
municated in an offensive manner during certain times of the
day.46
D. Content Regulation
The government regulates on the basis of content47 when it seeks
to favor or disfavor a speaker's viewpoint or choice of subject mat-
ter. Discrimination against the speaker because of his membership
42. See F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 33-34 (1982).
43. Sexually explicit speech is covered by the first amendment, but it is not always con-
sidered as a fully protected category of expression. The Court admits that sexually explicit
speech does not rank as high as "expression ... relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). Whether a
particular communication which is sexually explicit has any social value must be determined
by the form, content and context of the given statement as revealed by all the relevant
circumstances. Id. at 147-48. In FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364
(1984), the Court candidly admitted the obvious: restrictions on expression of editorial opin-
ion lie "at the heart of First Amendment protection." Id. at 381. However, the same cannot
be said of sexually explicit speech.
44. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
45. Id. at 732.
46. These complex cases defy the Court's "content-based" and "content-neutral" catego-
ries. Ordinances restricting the showing of adult films do "not appear to fit neatly into ei-
ther the 'content-based' or the 'content-neutral' category." City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1986).
47. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 37, at 1164 n.2 (citations of law review articles discussing
the many questions intrinsic to the distinction between content-based and content-neutral
regulations); see also Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WhL &
MARY L. REv. 189 (1983).
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in a group, his identity, or his status may or may not be impermis-
sible censorship.4 s The following subsections analyze various types
of content regulation.
1. Viewpoint Discrimination
The principle that it is impermissible for the government to dis-
criminate on the basis of viewpoint49 is basic in public forum
cases.50 According to the Supreme Court, the "government may not
grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable,
but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more con-
troversial views."51 Accordingly, when a speaker seems to use gov-
ernment property as a forum, a viewpoint discrimination always
triggers strict scrutiny.
52
2. Subject Matter Discrimination
"The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation
extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also
to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic."53 When the
government's denial of access to a traditional public forum turns
on the basis of the speaker's choice of subject matter, strict scru-
tiny frequently applies.54 However, it is unclear exactly what the
48. See infra text accompanying notes 65-68.
49. In City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984), the
Court stated "[T]he general principle that has emerged... is that the First Amendment
forbids the government from regulating speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas
at the expense of others." (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65-74
(1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980)).
50. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986); see also the cases cited by Justice Brennan in
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (dissenting
opinion).
51. Mosely, 408 U.S. at 92.
52. In fact, the government is not permitted to deny access to a speaker solely to suppress
the point of view he espouses. May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 787 F.2d 1105,
1113 (7th Cir. 1986) (excellent opinion by Posner, J., citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3451 (1985)); see National Socialist White Peo-
ple's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973) (school board could not deny use of
public facilities to group because of that group's racist views); cf. Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971) (state may not make public display of a four letter word criticizing the draft
a criminal offense).
53. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980).
54. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92
(1972).
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Court means by "subject matter" discrimination.55 For example,
restrictions on all political speech are subject matter restrictions
only if the term "subject matter" is used very loosely, as it often is.
Obviously, a content-based ban on political speech encompasses
many different subjects,56 and rarely will broad or total bans on
protected categories of speech be tolerated.51 Moreover, bans which
afford commercial speech more protection than noncommercial
speech incorporate impermissible content distinctions among cate-
gories of speech. 8
A ban on "controversial" subjects is a very dangerous kind of
"subject matter" ban. This kind of a subject matter ban gives the
law enforcement official too much discretion. For example, at some
city football stadiums, officials have discretion to remove certain
signs communicating religious ideas if a message is deemed "con-
troversial." In places open to the public, the government lacks
power to "deny use [of the forum] to those wishing to express...
controversial views."5'9 Before law enforcement officials are turned
loose to decide what is controversial, policy makers must, at the
very least, articulate reasonably specific adequate guidelines chan-
nelling the discretion of law enforcement officials. Otherwise, those
55. Stone, Restriction of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject
Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 81 (1978). Subject matter discrimination can refer to
a particular topic such as "the nature of the communist menace," or it can refer to a more
general subject such as a labor protest, as opposed to any other kind of protest. Subject
matter discrimination can be very abstract, for example, a restriction banning commercial
speech as opposed to political speech or vice versa. Presumably, a ban on controversial
speech can be subsumed as a form of subject matter discrimination. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 53-64.
56. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), the Court did not refer
to the government's distinctions between commercial and political messages as a distinction
based on subject matter. Political and commercial speech were treated as categories of ex-
pression containing several subjects. Id. at 501-02.
57. Content-based discrimination is not rendered "any less odious" because it distin-
guishes "among entire classes of ideas, rather than among points of view within a particular
class." Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 316 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Too many ideas are banned from the public forum when a fully protected category of speech
is totally banned. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (exclusion of religious speech
is not content-neutral).
58. See Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. 490.
59. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986) (citing Mosely,
408 U.S. at 95-96). For recent cases holding that sports complexes are nonpublic forums, see
Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Comm'n, 797 F.2d 552 (8th
Cir. 1986); Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1986); International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155 (3d Cir.
1982).
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who police the stadium have leeway to be invidiously selective or
arbitrary.
Guidelines specifying what subjects are too controversial should
also be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny. Assuming argu-
endo that the objective of eliminating controversy is itself permis-
sible, the government's decision that subject "A" is more contro-
versial than subject "B" can easily be used as a pretext to conceal
impermissible motives. Therefore, rules and guidelines identifying
controversial subjects should, in most cases, be treated as suspi-
cious content-based restrictions.
Even in nonpublic forum cases, government action restricting
"controversial" subject matter is likely to be arbitrary. Recently,
however, the Court failed to carefully examine a ban on controver-
sial charitable solicitation. The inadequacy of the Court's analy-
sis may be due to the fact that the case involved restrictions on
government employees in the workplace, an especially sensitive en-
vironment. It would be a mistake for the Court to always defer to
government policy makers who deny persons the use of nonpublic
forums solely because, in their view, the topic is too controversial.
Yet, by way of contrast, if a government agency holds a public
meeting, the agency may reserve the right to control and designate
its agenda. A designated agenda does not amount to censorship if
agenda topics can be justified on grounds of relevance.6 '
Some subjects are incompatible with the normal operation of a
public facility.6 2 For example, a public hospital that has a mater-
nity ward but also performs abortions may want to ban certain
subjects because of genuine health-related concerns.6 3 Patients in
public hospitals are a captive audience, and they need protection
from health-threatening verbal abuse. Therefore, strict judicial
scrutiny of subject matter restrictions is usually inapplicable. Such
restrictions present less danger of content-based discrimination if
60. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3446 (1985).
61. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 46 n.7
(1983); City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167, 175 n.8 (1976); see also Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3457-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military installation bans speeches of a parti-
san political nature); see also United States v. Albertini, 105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985) (same).
63. See Low Income People Together, Inc. v. Manning, 615 F. Supp. 501, 506 (N.D. Ohio
1985). But see Dallas Ass'n of Community Org. for Reform Now v. Dallas County Hosp.
Dist., 670 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1982), reh'g denied, 680 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1052 (1982).
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hospital policy makers intentionally designate appropriate enclaves
in the hospital as nonpublic forums.
Suppose the hospital desires to change its lobby from a limited
forum to a nonpublic forum. Such a change may be permitted
under some circumstances. However, the courts must not allow of-
ficials to collapse a limited forum into a nonpublic forum under the
pretext of a legitimate purpose. The courts may inquire whether a
discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the deci-
sion and the burden of coming forward with exculpatory evidence
should be on the government since the data base justifying a policy
change is usually in the policymaker's exclusive custody. If the
courts proceed to rubberstamp all policy changes, then protected
speech, compatible with the normal uses of a forum, can be sup-
pressed for impermissible reasons. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has yet to endorse heightened scrutiny, absent obvious view-
point discrimination, when limited forums are suspiciously trans-
formed into nonpublic forums.
3. Speaker Identity Discrimination
Restrictions that exclude particular speakers, or a class of speak-
ers, from a traditional public forum are considered presumptively
impermissible. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[I]n a public fo-
rum ... the state must demonstrate compelling reasons for re-
stricting access to a single class of speakers . . . .- However, the
government may refuse to open up a place or facility as a forum
for expressive activities, save for a limited class of speakers. For
example, in Perry, the school board legally denied access to the
interschool mail system to any "school employee organization" ex-
cept the teachers' duly elected exclusive bargaining representa-
tives.65 Similarly, in Widmar v. Vincent,'6 the Court emphasized
that a university may exclude speakers when the school's meeting
rooms are reserved for and limited to designated registered student
groups.6
64. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
65. Id. at 51-52.
66. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
67. Id. at 267-78 n.5.
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E. Methods of Suppressing Expression: Prior Restraints and
Standardless Discretion
Courts distinguish between methods of prior restraint and meth-
ods employing "a sanction applied after the event."6 Prior re-
straints have historically been disfavored. 9 "By placing discretion
in the hands of an official to grant or deny a license [or permit]
* . . a statute creates a threat of censorship that by its very exis-
tence chills free speech. ' 170
Rigorous procedural safeguards are required by the Constitution
whenever the law provides that a person needs advance permission
to engage in expressive activities arguably covered by the first
amendment. Although obscenity is non-protected speech, proce-
dural safeguards are nevertheless necessary when a licensing
agency refuses to permit the showing of an allegedly obscene film
or a play."1 One remarkable facet of the Court's prior restraint doc-
trine is its focus on process.
72
More so than other methods of suppressing speech, injunctions
frequently chill speech7" because violators can be summarily con-
victed of contempt of court.7 4 Accordingly, in New York Times Co.
68. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 281 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
69. T. EMERSON. THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESsIoN 504 (1970).
70. Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 282 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
71. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
72. Professor Gunther writes, "The procedural safeguards established by Freedman illus-
trate a wider phenomenon: procedural safeguards often have a special bite in the First
Amendment context. . . ." G. GUNTHER, supra note 37, at 1161 n.3 (1985); see also Redish,
The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L.
REV. 53 (1984).
73. Alexander Bickel wrote, "The violator of a prior restraint may be assured of being
held in contempt; the violator of a statute punishing speech ... may be willing to take his
chance, counting on a possible acquittal. A prior restraint, therefore, stops more speech
more effectively. A criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes." A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY
OF CONSENT 61 (1975).
The methods used by governments to obtain injunctions pose special dangers to a system
of free expression. For example, procedurally it is easier and quicker to initiate a civil action
seeking injunctive relief than to start a criminal prosecution. Arraignments, grand juries,
pretrial motions, and jury selection are obviously unnecessary. An application for a tempo-
rary restraining order may be heard immediately and, in some cases, it may be heard ex
parte. Id.
74. If an injunction erroneously deprives a person of a constitutional right, persons violat-
ing injunctions are punished for contempt even if it is clear that they are exercising fully
protected first amendment rights. Contempt, even civil contempt, is punishable by fine and
imprisonment. The only exceptions to this rule are when the court issuing the injunction
lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter or person.
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v. United States,75 Justice Stewart held that the Pentagon Papers
could not be suppressed in advance of publication unless "disclos-
ure . . . will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable
damage to our Nation or its people. '7 6
Prior restraint cases are being compartmentalized into their own
special pigeonholes. For example, the Supreme Court's scrutiny in
sixth amendment cases is less exacting than the "stricter" scrutiny
applicable in the routine prior restraint case." Moreover, if the
speaker's expressive activities are reprehensible, 78 and akin to a
non-protected method of communication, the Court may ignore
what is usually a heavy presumption against the constitutional va-
lidity of a prior restraint.79
F. Methods of Communication: Pure Speech, Symbolic Speech,
and Non-Protected Methods
Prior restraints and standardless systems of law enforcement are
methods of suppression that "create an unacceptable risk of the
suppression of ideas. ' 80 The method a speaker uses to communi-
cate is also a variable which determines a court's level of scrutiny.
This section of the article focuses on three methods of communica-
tion:81 pure speech, symbolic speech, and non-protected methods
75. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
76. Id. at 730. The government could not successfully shoulder this weighty burden of
persuasion. The court that issues an injunction is predicting the future because the judge is
required to find that the prior restraint is necessary to prevent grave and irreparable harm.
If it is said that publication of a news story will endanger national security, the judge who is
concerned about his own reputation will be tempted to suppress the story. If the judge
permits the story to be published and the story causes harm, the judge will be blamed. The
Supreme Court, well aware of this problem, requires the judge to demand from the govern-
ment an unusually clear and convincing showing of compelling need.
77. Compare Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) with the opinions of
Justices Black, Brennan, and Stewart in New YorkTimes Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971). See also Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 540-42 (1977);
Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of The-
ory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431, 458-66 (1977).
78. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (former CIA employee not
able to publish material about Vietnam War due to agreement with employer).
79. See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
80. See Secretary of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839, 2852 n.13 (1984)
and cases cited therein.
81. The text generalizes when it refers to only three methods of communication. The gen-
eralizations include a vast spectrum of behavior ranging from a murderer's violent outburst
that expresses a hateful disposition having little or no social or cognitive value to a temper-
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of expressive activity.s2
Pure speech includes conventional verbal communication such as
conversing, leafletting, handbilling, publication of newspapers,
door-to-door solicitation, and posting of written messages. Pictorial
expression is also usually regarded as pure speech. Pure speech
usually involves physical movement. The speaker must move his
lips, the handbiller must tender someone a printed leaflet, the
sound truck blaring a sermon must travel on the streets, and the
newspaper must be printed and delivered. Physical movement
makes communication possible; it is the means through which a
speaker communicates verbally. However, a different function is
performed by the symbolic speaker's physical movement; his phys-
ical gesture does not merely facilitate communication, but it is a
substitute for a verbal message.8 3 Nevertheless, first amendment
rights "are not confined to verbal expression" but embrace other
"appropriate types" of protected symbolic speech; 4 symbolic
speech should not be confused with non-protected methods of
speech."5
In order to qualify as the type of symbolic speech that deserves
heightened scrutiny, a speaker must show that (1) his nonverbal
conduct communicates a particular message having cognitive value;
(2) the message itself is included within a protected category of
speech;s8 and (3) his method of communication is compatible with
first amendment values.8 7 The next three subsections elaborate on
ate conversation by a political candidate who is speaking to sidewalk pedestrians about his
candidacy.
82. On occasion the Supreme Court and various specialists in constitutional law call non-
protected methods of expressive activity "speech plus." The term is sometimes confusing
and misleading. Basically, it suggests that pure speech is supplemented by non-protected
speech and that non-protected speech can be regulated by the government notwithstanding
its close relationship with protected speech.
83. Words themselves, of course, are symbols. Symbolic speech, however, is a nonverbal
symbol of an object of cognition.
84. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131
(1966).
85. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
86. Examples of protected categories of speech are non-malicious libel of public officials
and public figures, insults (not fighting words), religious speech, and non-obscene artistic
speech. Examples of somewhat protected categories of speech are some forms of commercial
speech, and some forms of sexually explicit speech. Examples of non-protected speech are
perjury, bribery, price fixing, conspiracy to commit crime, most non-political solicitation of
crimes, malicious libel, obscenity, child pornography, and fighting words. Note that it is
possible for a method of communication to be non-protected even if the message communi-
cated is in a protected category.
87. If the challenger shoulders the initial burden of persuasion, and unless other variables
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these prerequisites.
1. Messages with Cognitive Value
Not all conduct may be labelled as symbolic speech simply be-
cause an actor intends to express an idea.89 Symbolic speech must
"reasonably be understood by the viewer to be communicative."" e
To be safe, the putative speaker must convince the court that
the message intended to be conveyed is a "particularized message"
or a "pointed expression," more focused than some vague, inar-
ticulable feeling about nothing in particular.9 0 If the putative
speaker conveys nothing but mindless nihilism,"1 he has not con-
veyed an intelligible, particularized message.
The Supreme Court's emphasis in Spence v. Washington con-
cerning the need for a "particularized message"9 2 is insensitive to
the evocative power of a symbol "that works mysteriously on the
human consciousness so as to suggest more than it can clearly de-
scribe."9 3 Because symbols have the power to instill sentiments
that motivate persons to act, perhaps the Court should not always
insist on a particularized message. Symbols have the power to tap
a vast amount of understanding that transcends any particular
message.9 4 Moreover, symbolic speech generates insights that can-
not be precisely articulated in terms of categorical thought and
language.95
increase or decrease the court's level of scrutiny, the government's ban or regulation of sym-
bolic speech is valid only if the government shows that the "conduct itself may constitution-
ally be regulated" and that the regulation or ban of this kind of symbolic expression "is
narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental interest" that is "unrelated to the
suppression of free speech." Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
294 (1984). In public forum cases, the intermediate level of scrutiny used for symbolic
speech cases "is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner
restrictions." Id. at 298; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). It is well
settled that a speaker's manner of nonverbal expression does not qualify as symbolic speech.
88. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S, 367, 376 (1968).
89. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984); see also
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (an intent to convey a particularized
message).
90. The Court has stated that "the advancement of a plausible contention" that the
speaker is engaged in symbolic speech is insufficient. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 n.5.
91. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
92. Id. at 411.
93. A. DULLES, MODELS OF REVELATION 131 (1985).
94. Id. at 132 ("A symbol is a sign gegment with a plenitude of meaning which is evoked
rather than explicity stated.").
95. Id. at 136-37.
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Conduct is frequently understood as an intelligible message96
only because of the speaker's verbal explanation.97 For example,
the person who burns his draft card while saying he is opposed to
war is using words that clarify the purpose and meaning of his ac-
tivity. On the other hand, the person who silently burns his draft
card, along with other sundry, unrelated items, is not clearly com-
municating an intelligible message.
Suppose, however, that a farmer murders a banker and exclaims
that his homicide is a protest against society's insensitivity toward
the economic plight of farmers. If the farmer demonstrates he was
motivated by his desire to protest society's aforesaid insensitivity
and his violent act is so understood, his message, given its context,
has cognitive value,98 and thereby satisfies the first of the Court's
symbolic speech prerequisites.
2. Messages Within a Protected Category of Speech
A person who has communicated a message having cognitive
value is not engaged in the kind of symbolic speech that triggers
heightened scrutiny if the message itself is in a non-protected cate-
gory of speech. For example, if the message communicated by our
hypothetical farmer who shoots a banker is intended and under-
stood as "advocacy. .. directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action," 99 the
96. In some cases the expressive activity may be facilitative. For example, a creative im-
aginative act that dramatizes the plight of the homeless may enhance the likelihood that
speakers with little money can capture the attention of the mass media and thereby reach a
larger audience in a more meaningful way. The facilitative purpose of a sleep-in will have
independent status as symbolic speech if it is closely related to expressive activity, is in-
tended to facilitate the dissemination of the speaker's message and is understood to be an
intelligible message in its own right. Cf. Clark, 104 S. Ct. at 3077 n.7. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
97. In Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), an individual, Spence, was charged
with improper use of the United States flag when he affixed to the flag a large peace symbol
fashioned of removable tape. The Court held that such conduct qualified as symbolic speech
in part because "the nature of [Spence's] activity, combined with the factual context and
environment in which it was undertaken, led to the conclusion that he engaged in a form of
protected expression." Id. at 409-10. The Court added, "the context in which a symbol is
used for purposes of expression is important, for the context may give meaning to the sym-
bol." Id. at 410.
98. However, an argument may be made that the method of communication chosen by
the farmer is non-protected and not worthy 6f first amendment protection because violence
is incompatible with the values underlying the first amendment. See infra text accompany-
ing note 100.
99. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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farmer's message would clearly be outside the bounds of protected
expression. Symbolic conduct does not transform a non-protected
category of expression into a protected one.
3. Methods Compatible With First Amendment Values
Expressive activities do not qualify as symbolic speech if the
speaker's methods are incompatible with the values undergirding
the first amendment. 00 If a farmer kills a banker as a political pro-
test, the Constitution should not be sullied by suggesting that mur-
der furthers first amendment values.
One of the many values underlying freedom of speech is the
safety valve function. 10' "It is thought that men will be less in-
clined to resort to violence to achieve given ends if they are free to
express themselves through speech advocating such ends."'1 2 How-
ever, if violent methods are used, the prophylactic safety valve
function has already failed. Another first amendment value is the
open marketplace of ideas10 3 where, theoretically, the truth is dis-
coverable if allowed to surface. However, if the "speaker" uses du-
ress or unduly coercive activities, he cannot credibly claim he is
participating in the free trade of ideas. Similarly, the arguments
for a participatory democracy' 4 do not justify violence, since
methods of expression that seek to force intimidated citizens to
adopt unpersuasive data, ideas and creeds are obviously undemo-
cratic. "Self-fulfillment"'0 5 is another value said to underlie the
first amendment. Professor Emerson has eloquently written of the
enhancement of "personal growth and self-realization" in freedom
of speech. 06 Yet, when a speaker's methods cause his victim's se-
vere psychological or physical harm, such intolerable methods usu-
ally go far beyond the bounds of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" debate. 0 7
100. Intolerable methods of expressing an intelligible message protected by the first
amendment could be called symbolic "conduct" to distinguish these non-protected methods
of protected symbolic "speech."
101. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
102. M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 1.04.
103. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
104. See M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 1.02 (h).
105. See id. § 1.03 (citing Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). See
generally M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 1.03 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978) ("the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression")).
106. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssioN 6 (1970).
107. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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Courts draw a distinction between protected symbolic speech
that encourages or embarrasses a targeted person into action'"8
and non-protected intimidating symbolic conduct, which denies co-
erced, victimized persons the autonomy to choose an alternative
course of conduct. 0 9 Extortion and blackmail are obviously non-
protected methods of coercion. Although not as clear, secondary
boycotts and economic picketing may be verbal acts that send sig-
nals triggering an "automatic response. . . rather than a reasoned
response to an idea." 10 Such performative speech by labor unions
is usually non-protected because courts routinely defer to Con-
gress's judgment concerning unfair picketing by those protesting
economic conditions."' Recently, however, the Court has strongly
hinted that it will invoke the intermediate level of scrutiny"l2 in
picketing cases that involve political protests." 3
Although intolerable methods of communication using violence
or intimidation are generally not protected by the first amend-
ment, nonverbal expressive activity does not lose its protected
character simply because it embarrasses persons into action. In-
deed, not all concerted expressive activity is removed from the
reach of the first amendment simply because of its coercive
tendency." 4
G. Categories of Forums
In the first amendment situations described in the preceding
sections of this article, an individual's freedom to speak depended
upon numerous variables that interact in complicated ways. The
108. Id.
109. This distinction is critical in cases involving the picketing of abortion clinics. See
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
110. Id.
111. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 618 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Professor Tribe notes the existence of a notion called the "signal doctrine" that
"effectively remove[s] the protection from speech . . .because of its lack of affirmative
value in the eyes of the court." L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 399 n.100.
112. See L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 203.
113. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982);
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
114. Compare Allied Int'l Inc., 456 U.S. at 226-27 n.26 with Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. at 925-26. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that "absent clear
Congressional intent to the contrary," non-violent picketing and boycotts, primary and sec-
ondary, are "ordinarily entitled to protection under the first and fourteenth amendments."
Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 795 F.2d 1161,
1163 (4th Cir. 1986).
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forum where one attempts to exercise first amendment rights is
another extremely important variable.115
1. The Traditional Public Forum
In traditional public forums, unlike nonpublic forums, "the
rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply circum-
scribed." 116 More specifically, "[b]ecause a principle purpose of
traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas, speakers can
be excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest and when the exclusion is
narrowly drawn to achieve that interest."117 Moreover, partial bans
keyed to time, place and manner considerations are valid only if
they "are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government inter-
est" and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. 1 8
The Court has stated that "streets, sidewalks, parks and other
similar public places are so historically associated *ith the exercise
of First Amendment rights that access to them for the purpose of
exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly
and absolutely."11  Other public places besides streets, parks, malls
and sidewalks may also be traditionally open to the public.
A lack of tradition "weighs against public forum status." 2 For
example, in Edwards v. South Carolina,1 21 the Court reversed the
convictions of demonstrators on the State House grounds because
the property had traditionally been open to the public. But, in Ad-
derly v. Florida,1 22 the trespass convictions of persons demonstrat-
ing on jailhouse grounds were upheld because jailhouses have not
traditionally been open to the public. Similarly, in Greer v.
115. Farber and Nowak believe that public forum analysis "distracts attention from the
first amendment values at stake in a given case." Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature
of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Cdntext In First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA.
L. REv. 1219, 1224 (1984).
116. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
117. See Cornelius v. NAACP Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448 (1985).
118. Id. at 3439.
119. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 315 (1968), overruled on other grounds, Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-19
(1976).
120. Note, A Worthy Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned
Property, 35 STAN. L. REv. 121, 136 (1982).
121. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
122. 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966).
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Spock, 2 3 the Court refused to accord public forum status to parts
of the Fort Dix military base open to the public because "[tihe
notion that federal military reservations, like municipal streets and
parks, have traditionally served as a place for free public assembly
and communication of thoughts by private citizens is . . .histori-
cally. . . false."124 The Court has also refused to recognize a letter
box as a public forum because "[tjhere is neither historical nor
constitutional support of the characterization of a letter box as a
public forum."12 5 In short, tradition informs judgment when the
question is whether government property is a public forum.
2. The Limited Forum
A government facility not traditionally open to expressive activ-
ity may be intentionally "opened for use by the public as a place
for expressive activity." 12 6 To the limited extent that a forum is
open to the public, government officials are "bound by the same
standards as apply in a traditional public forum. '12  Therefore,
time, place and manner restrictions must be reasonable, and a con-
tent-based prohibition is constitutional only if the government can
show it is "a precisely drawn means of serving as a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. '128
"[A limited] public forum may be created by government desig-
nation of a place or channel of communication for use by. . .cer-
tain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects. 1 29 Places
opened up for limited kinds of expressive activity have included
theaters, auditoriums and stadiums. For example, in Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,30 a municipal theater had been dedi-
cated to the public as a "community center. . . where civic, educa-
tional, religious, patriotic and charitable organizations and associa-
123. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
124. Id. at 838.
125. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenhurgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 128(1981).
126. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
127. Id. at 46. But see United States v, Albertini, 105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985) (military base not
open to public).
128. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Coum'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
129. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3449 (1985)
(citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 n.7); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981)
(holding state university may not close its facilities to student group desiring use for reli-
gious worship).
130. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
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tions may have a common meeting place. . . devoted for cultural
advancement, and for clean, healthful, entertainment which will
make for the upbuilding of a better citizenship." 131 The Court de-
scribed this forum, designated for limited purposes, as a public fo-
rum "designed for and dedicated to expressive activities.' 1 32 Since
the Court equated the limited forum with the city's "public streets
and parks"'3 3 and since its level of scrutiny was not diminished,
the city's ban of the musical "Hair" was an invalid prior restraint
that failed to survive strict scrutiny.
3. The Collapsible Limited Forum
The Supreme Court is just developing the distinctions between
limited public forums and nonpublic forums and a great deal more
clarity is needed. One difficulty is the collapsible nature of the lim-
ited forum. On the one hand, "[t]he constitution forbids a state to
enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the pub-
lic even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place
. "...,, On the other hand, the limited public forum need not be
kept open indefinitely.135 If the Court's tripartite classification of
forums is to remain credible, the limited public forum, although
collapsible, should not be collapsible at the whim of an official who
suddenly deviates from an established policy, rule, ' 3 or practice.
Any repeal or change of a rule that transforms a limited forum
into a nonpublic forum or constricts the scope of the policy previ-
ously designating the forum's limits should be viewpoint neutral.
Moreover, if the government collapses a forum merely to avoid
controversy,3 " the Court should not always defer; it may have to
balance competing interests before it designates government prop-
erty as a nonpublic forum. 3 8 The Court has yet to make this point
crystal clear.
131. Id. at 549 n.4 (quoting trial exhibit).
132. Id. at 555.
133. Id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
134. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
135. Id. at 46.
136. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535,
539-40 (1959) (government agencies are bound by their own substantive rules until duly
repealed or amended); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-67
(1954).
137. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 925 (1986).
138. See Justice Blackmun's cogent dissent in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and
Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3459 (1985).
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4. The Government's Intent to Maintain a Nonpublic Forum
The "nonpublic forum, by definition, is not dedicated to general
debate or the free exchange of ideas." 13 9 This definition refers us
back to the government's intentions concerning the use of the rele-
vant forum. The Cornelius plurality stated,
The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a
non-traditional forum for public discourse .... Accordingly, the
Court has looked to the policy and practice of the government to
ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally
open to assembly and debate as a public forum .... The Court has
also examined the nature of the property and its compatibility with
expressive activity to discern the government's intent.140
Despite the Court's focus on the question whether the subject mat-
ter of the expressive activity is compatible with the customary or
normal uses of the facility, lower court judges should not assume
the Supreme Court is using a compatibility test in lieu of a test
based on the government's intent.M  According to the Cornelius
plurality, the speaker's burden of persuasion is fully met only by
"evidence of a purposeful designation" permitting access.142 Com-
patibility is but one factor used by judges who are attempting to
discern the government's intent. The Cornelius plurality empha-
sizes the relevance of the government's purpose by stating that
"[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on sub-
ject matter and speaker identity as long as the distinctions are rea-
sonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are view-
point neutral.' 4  Nevertheless, if a court believes, in light of all
the surrounding circumstances, that the government restriction is
a pretext, this kind of a "sham" may not justify the collapse of a
forum. In sum, restrictions on expressive activity, compatible with
the functions of a nonpublic forum, are legitimate, so long as they
are reasonable in "light of the [genuine viewpoint neutral] purpose
139. Cornelius, v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3454 (1985).
140. Id. at 3449 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
141. Accord Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1986) (Feinberg, C.J.).
But see Low Income People Together, Inc., v. Manning, 615 F. Supp. 501, 513 (N.D. Ohio
1985).
142. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3451.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
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of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances. 1 44
Nonpublic enclaves may exist within a limited public forum. For
example, on public school property, certain channels of communi-
cation, like internal mail facilities, may be intentionally closed to
all but a few designated employees who are given special status. 1 5
The Court has also held that a particular channel of communica-
tion within the federal workplace may be restricted to certain des-
ignated charities.1 46 Thus, when government property is opened as
a limited public forum, part of the area can be intentionally walled
off as a nonpublic enclave.
III. CONCLUSION
Many variables combine and interact to increase the level of ju-
dicial scrutiny in first amendment cases. However, all of the so-
called levels of judicial scrutiny, especially the intermediate level
of scrutiny, have been subject to criticism either because of their
perceived weaknesses in protecting speech or because of the
Court's inconsistent application of such tests. 47 Although it might
appear that the levels of scrutiny are divided into three watertight
compartments, the intensity variations, when considered realisti-
cally, actually combine to form a continuum.
The Court's pigeonholes may be too confining because first
amendment freedoms need breathing space. A nonpublic forum
concept, solely dependent on the government's intentions, denies
speakers access to many places where freedom of speech would fur-
ther first amendment values. 148 Moreover, access rights in the non-
public forum discriminate against the less affluent since expressive
activities at nonpublic forums may be less costly than alternative
forums. e 49 Nevertheless, the Court presumes that speakers usually
"have access to alternative" channels of communication and sup-
poses that "[r]arely will a nonpublic forum provide the only means
144. Id. at 3453.
145. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
146. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3450-51, 3455.
147. See Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REv. 1287,
1288 (1979).
148. See Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3456 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 3453. It is possible that the government's choice to keep a forum nonpublic
could be adjudged unreasonable if the speaker has at his disposal no other substantial alter-
native channels of communication. See Perry, 450 U.S. at 53.
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of contact with a particular audience." 150 We have to wait and see
what the Court will do if its presumptions and suppositions turn
out to be demonstrably untrue.
Public forum doctrine is admittedly a complicated body of law'51
that can become, in the hands of the wrong judge, unduly concep-
tualistic. On the other hand, many of the Court's pigeonholes re-
duce the opportunities for ad hoc, and unprincipled, decisions by
lower court judges.
Public forum pigeonholes, therefore, are the lesser of two evils.
The Court's tendency to adhere to sharply defined categories is un-
derstandable. The pigeonholes, the frameworks, the levels of scru-
tiny, the multi-pronged and multi-tiered tests represent a com-
mendable effort to "bring order to a universe of unruly happenings
and to give guidance for the future. . . to others. But it is certain
that life will bring up cases whose facts simply cannot be handled
by purely verbal formulas, or at least not handled with any sophis-
tication and feeling for the underlying values at stake." When such
cases are presented, the courts will have to adjust and recur back
to the first principles, which cherish the unique value of public fo-
rum access.
150. Professor Robert C. Post, however, points out "that one begins to lose all sense of
confidence in the doctrine formulations of the First Amendment law when one sees all the
rules aligned with all these many pigeonholes." Letter from Robert C. Post to Gary C.
Leedes (April 11, 1986).
151. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 2662 (1985).
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